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 Designing effective communication strategies for correcting vaccines misinformation 
requires an understanding of how the target group might react to information from different 
sources. The present study examined whether erroneous inferences about vaccination could 
be effectively corrected by a perceived credible (i.e., expert or trustworthy) source. Two 
experiments are reported using a standard continued influence paradigm, each featuring two 
correction conditions on vaccine misinformation. Participants were presented with a story 
containing a piece of information that was later retracted by a perceived credible or not so 
credible source. Experiment 1 showed that providing a correction reduced participants’ use of 
the original erroneous information, yet the overall reliance on misinformation did not 
significantly differ between the low- and high-expertise correction groups. Experiment 2 
revealed that a correction from a high-trustworthy source decreased participants’ reliance on 
misinformation when making inferences, nonetheless it did not positively affect the reported 
intent to vaccinate one’s child. Overall, source trustworthiness was more relevant than source 
expertise.  
 












 Despite being lauded as one of the greatest public health achievements of the 20th 
century, vaccines are losing public confidence (Larson et al. 2011), to the extent that some 
experts have described the problem as “a crisis of public confidence” (Black and Rappuoli 
2010, p. 1) and a “vaccination backlash” (Shetty 2010, p. 970). Misinformation about vaccine 
safety and efficacy is just one of several challenges that immunization programs have to deal 
with. Scandals involving politicians, journalists and pseudo-scientists also make it difficult 
for communicators to set the record straight on vaccination (Myers and Pineda 2009).  
It is difficult to replace misinformation with accurate facts because, even if individuals are 
presented with blatantly false information, they persist in biased reasoning and are highly 
resistant to correction attempts (Lewandowsky et al. 2012). In the case of vaccine 
misinformation, several psychological mechanisms render misinformation particularly 
“sticky” and/or pro-vaccination beliefs counter-intuitive (Miton and Mercier 2015). These 
include confirmation bias (the propensity to seek out information that confirms one’s pre-
existing beliefs about vaccination; Voinson et al. 2015), omission bias (the tendency to prefer 
a potentially harmful inaction –  an act of omission, as in the case of non-vaccination – over a 
potentially less harmful act – an act of commission, as in the case of vaccination; Brown et al. 
2010), or the feelings of “overconfidence” regarding one’s own knowledge about a topic 
(Motta et al. 2018). In light of these complexities, corrective efforts can often be ineffective 
or even yield unintended and undesirable consequences (Cook and Lewandowsky 2011; 
Lewandowsky et al. 2012). For instance, pro-vaccination messages repeating the myth that 
vaccines cause autism in order to debunk it can actually strengthen familiarity with the 
misinformation, paradoxically increasing the likelihood that people will recall it and assume 
it to be true (Nyhan et al. 2014; Pluviano et al. 2017; Pluviano et al. 2019). However, while 
several studies indicate that the best strategy to counter vaccine misinformation is to 
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emphasize the facts instead of drawing further attention to false information (e.g. Nyhan et al. 
2014; Pluviano et al. 2017; Pluviano et al. 2019; Peter and Koch 2016), other recent accounts 
suggest that if a myth is not repeated when corrected, the associated lack of salience, conflict 
detection, and myth/correction co-activation may be equally or even more detrimental to 
belief updating than the boost of the myth’s familiarity (Swire et al. 2017). Anyhow, any pro-
vaccination campaign will fall short when it crafts messages only based on what it intends to 
promote, without addressing existing perceptions and individual scepticism about scientists 
(Larson 2018). 
 
The issue of credibility in experts and science 
 Not all communications are equally persuasive; the perceived credibility of the source 
of information delivering the message is an important component of a sound pro-vaccination 
campaign (Guillory and Geraci 2013; Schmidt et al. 2016). Therefore, designing effective 
communication strategies for correcting vaccines misinformation requires an understanding 
of how the target group might react to different sources of information (Kumkale et al. 2010). 
One critical question concerns the credibility of different sources that inform people’s 
vaccination decisions (Yaqub et al. 2014). Unfortunately, researchers and practitioners find it 
difficult to design effective pro-vaccination messages for two reasons. First, few principles of 
message persuasiveness derive from effective attempts to change anti-social or unhealthy 
attitudes and behaviours (Crano and Burgoon 2002; McNeill et al. 2017), while many refer to 
quite distant contexts such as advertising (e.g., Gotlieb and Sarel 2013; Nan 2013). Therefore, 
the pro-vaccination messages are not properly informed by relevant theory and previous 
research. Second, as mentioned above, the messages can backfire, yielding unintended and 
undesirable repercussions. The present study seeks to address the important yet neglected 
issue of the impact of source credibility on the efficacy of pro-vaccination messages. 
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 Most theories of persuasion predict that highly credible sources produce more belief 
and attitude changes than less credible ones (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Pornpitakpan 2004). 
The present study refers to the most common notion of credibility in psychology and 
communication research, which rests largely on perceptions of credibility of the information 
source as interpreted by the information receiver. This notion encompasses two core 
dimensions: expertise, namely the extent to which the communicator is perceived to be 
capable of making correct assertions, and trustworthiness, that is the willingness of the 
communicator to provide the assertions he or she considers most valid (Hovland et al. 1953). 
The expertise and trustworthiness dimensions may have differential weights in affecting 
belief and attitude change and assessing them in combination may obscure the complexity of 
the source evaluation (Pornpitakpan 2004). For example, Guillory and Geraci (2013) 
analysed the individual contribution of source trustworthiness and expertise in reducing 
political misinformation, revealing that source expertise was not sufficient to reduce 
erroneous inferences, while the trustworthiness of the source was the critical factor that led 
people to correct their inferences. However, they argued that the expertise of the source could 
be more relevant in other contexts, such as in medical decision making, and encouraged 
further studies to test this hypothesis.  
 As science communicators well know, communication is not just about logic and 
knowledge, but also about emotions. When it comes to sensitive topics such as vaccinations, 
credible experts like doctors or scientists may earn the audience’s respect, but not necessarily 
their trust (Benegal 2018; Fiske and Dupree 2014). Public evaluations of expertise may 
indeed be independent from the source’s technical knowledge or credentials and can be 
misled by emotions and gut feelings. For instance, one may trust a certain celebrity or a 
politician simply because he/she claims to have the public’s best interest at heart, or rely on 
vaccines-hesitant parents thinking that no parent would ever do something bad for their child 
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(Archer 2014). Numerous studies on vaccine hesitancy in the US and UK (e.g., Freed et al. 
2011; Marlow et al. 2007; Salmon et al. 2005) have found that distrust in the healthcare 
system may contribute to under-immunisation. The same worrying relationship exists in 
developing countries. For example, a recent study by Woskie and Fallah (2019) exposed how 
high rates of distrust in the health system contributed to recent Ebola epidemics, which 
demonstrates how medical distrust may affect universal health coverage. 
 Acknowledging that trust is pivotal in vaccination decision-making policies (Benin et 
al. 2006; Mills et al. 2005), the current study provides the first empirical examination of 
whether erroneous inferences about vaccination could be effectively corrected by a source 
perceived as credible (i.e., expert or trustworthy). In particular, we seek to evaluate the 
relative effects of source expertise and trustworthiness on people’s ability to disregard 
misinformation and update their knowledge and memories, and to identify the subsequent 
effect of the source on people’s stated intention to vaccinate their child.  
 
1. Norming 
 A norming study was first conducted to identify high- and low-expert sources, and 
high- and low-trustworthy sources within the health context. A separate group of participants, 
who did not take part in the following experiments, was used. This group consisted of 15 
students from the University of Edinburgh (4 males, 11 females, mean age 22.4 years, age 
range 18-33 years), who voluntarily participated in exchange for course credit. Participants 
read a fictitious story (see Experiment 1) where a piece of information is corrected towards 
the end of the story. After reading the story, they were given a list of sources of information 
and asked to imagine that the correction came from the source in question. They were asked 
to rate the expertise and trustworthiness of each source, using a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(= “to little or no extent expert/trustworthy”) to 5 (= “to a great extent expert/trustworthy”). 
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Based on the means of participants’ ratings, sources of health information were identified as 
low-credibility, neutral, and high-credibility. The inter-rater reliability was very high, the ICC 
(intraclass correlation coefficient) was .961 with a 95% confidence interval from .942 to .976 
[F(43, 602) = 29.346, p < .001] (a report on the norming study is presented in File S1).  
 
2. Experiment 1 
 Both experiments reported in this study used a standard continued influence paradigm 
(Johnson and Seifert 1994; Wilkes and Leatherbarrow 1988), whereby participants are 
presented with one piece of information at a time about an unfolding fictional event. The 
report typically contains a target piece of mistaken information that is later corrected. 
Participants’ understanding of the event is then assessed with an open-ended questionnaire 
consisting of factual and inference questions. To evaluate whether the correction was 
effective, the number of clear references to the target piece of mistaken information in 
participants’ responses is tallied.  
 Experiment 1 examined the individual’s ability to disregard vaccine misinformation 
and adjust behaviour accordingly, when the correction is provided by a source of information 
deemed to be high or low in expertise.  
 
2.1 Method 
 Participants. Due to this being the first study to test the effects of source credibility in 
the vaccines context, no specific effect size estimate was available to guide a priori power 
analysis. However, in line with previous literature on source credibility (Guillory and Geraci 
2013), we tested a total of N = 90 participants, all undergraduate students from the University 
of Edinburgh (25 men, , 65 women, mean age 18.91 years, age range 18-35 years), who 
participated on a voluntary basis and received course credit in exchange for their 
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participation. Participants were tested individually. A quasi-random method of condition 
allocation was used whereby participants were assigned alternatively to 1 of 3 conditions, 
namely the High-expertise Correction condition, the Low-expertise Correction condition, or 
the Baseline No-correction condition (30 per condition). The study received ethical approval 
from the University of Edinburgh’s Ethics Committee. 
 Study design. A between-subjects design was used with condition (two correction 
conditions and a baseline no-correction condition) as the independent variable, while the 
dependent variables were (a) the accuracy of recall (free-recall and fact-recall score), and 
most importantly, (b) the extent to which misinformation persists in one’s memory (use of the 
original information to answer inference questions) and (c) the intention to vaccinate one’s 
child (vaccination intent). For multiple comparisons between groups, Tukey’s HSD 
correction method was applied. Significance was set at p < .05 for all analyses. Two principal 
hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Participants will be less likely to use the original misinformation to answer 
inference questions when receiving a correction from a high-expert source than from a 
low-expert source.  
H2: Participants who rely more on misinformation will report a lower intention to 
vaccinate their own child. 
 Hypothesis 1 derived from the literature on source credibility effects showing that 
highly credible sources have proven to be more persuasive than less credible sources 
(Hovland et al. 1953; Pornpitakpan 2004). Furthermore, as suggested in a recent study by 
Jennings and Russel (2019), individuals who are convinced that the source delivering the 
corrective information is credible will spend more time and energy considering that 
information and will be more likely to incorporate it when forming later judgments and 
decisions and developing attitudinal dispositions. Hypothesis 2 was based upon recent studies 
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showing the ineffectiveness of efforts to combat health misinformation and to increase intent 
to vaccinate a future child (Nyhan and Reifler 2015; Nyhan et al. 2014; Pluviano et al. 2017; 
Pluviano et al. 2019). 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 Participants read a fictitious story about a child developing ADHD (attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder) after receiving the vaccine against “Brainpox” (the full story is 
presented in File S2), described as a serious illness. This story contained a critical piece of 
information – a rumour claiming a link between this vaccine and ADHD. In the two 
correction conditions, the High- and Low-expertise Correction conditions, a message 
specifically asserted that this rumour was incorrect. In the baseline no-correction condition, 
this information was not corrected. For both correction conditions, participants received the 
correction from one of the sources of information as identified during the norming study (a 
report on the norming study is presented in File S1).  
 For Experiment 1, in the High-expertise Correction condition the correction came 
from “Websites from doctor groups like the British Association of General Paediatrics” as a 
source with a high level of expertise (M = 4.07, SD = .88), while in the Low-expertise 
Correction condition the correction came from “Celebrities” as a source with a low level of 
expertise (M = 1.33, SD = .62). The high- and low-expert source of information did not differ 
regarding their degree of trustworthiness t(14) = 1.848, p = .086, (M = 2.73, SD = .7 and M = 
2.06, SD = .97, respectively). 
 After reading the story, all participants were exposed to a rehearsal-preventing 
distractor task lasting 2 minutes, during which they were asked to count backwards by 3. 
Then, they were given a free-recall test, in which they were asked to write everything they 
remembered reading in the story as accurately as possible. After, participants completed a 
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questionnaire (the questionnaire is presented in File S3) including specific questions about 
the story. The first eight questions (fact-recall questions) were designed so that participants 
could answer them by recalling the literal content of the story, while the following eight 
(inference questions) were designed so that participants could answer them by making their 
own judgments, claims, or predictions about the elements presented in the stories, not just to 
recall them (as in the free-recall and fact questions). Inferential questions are of the utmost 
importance because they may show the ongoing impact of misinformation on people’s 
memory, even after clear retractions. For example, when people make inferences regarding 
the causal chain leading up to an event (e.g., the onset of a disease), misinformation (e.g., the 
false claim of a connection between the vaccine and the disease, that is later corrected) is 
often relied upon, even when people accurately remember its retraction (Ecker et al. 2014). 
After the inference questions, just for the participants in the correction conditions, there was a 
retraction-awareness question controlling for insufficient encoding, asking what was the 
message given by the source providing the correction. Finally, participants rated how likely 
they would be to give the vaccine against the illness at hand to their own child on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (= “very unlikely”) to 6 (= “very likely”).  
 
2.3 Results 
 Coding procedure. A scorer checked all the participants’ answers to the retraction-
awareness question in order to only include data for those who correctly answered this 
question, therefore ensuring that results did not reflect differences in participants’ ability to 
recall the retraction statement. All participants recalled the purpose of the message from the 
source of the correction. Free recall, factual questions, and inference questions were scored 
by different pairs of judges blind to condition allocation and acting independently. Inter-rater 
reliability was high (r = .93, .88, .90, respectively).  
11 
 
 The free recall test was scored using “idea units”. Each idea unit corresponded to one 
of the 14 messages in the story. An idea unit was recorded as being recalled and received a 
score of 1 if the participant reproduced all or substantial part of its content; otherwise it was 
scored as absent and received a score of 0. The highest possible individual score was 
therefore 14. 
 Factual questions were scored 1 for correct responses and 0 for incorrect responses. 
Responses containing partially correct information were given a score of 0.5. Since 8 factual 
recall questions were presented, the maximum possible score was 8. 
 Inference questions were scored 0 or 1. Responses wherein participants mentioned 
ADHD but indicated any disbelief in the vaccine causing ADHD were not scored as 1. Using 
a strict scoring system, any uncontroverted belief in the vaccine causing ADHD was 
considered a reference to the original and incorrect information and was scored as 1, while 0 
was assigned to all “other” responses, including comments about the benefits of vaccines or 
worries over their safety but not the use of the original and incorrect information (the alleged 
link between the vaccine and ADHD). For example, for question no. 9 “How do you think the 
baby’s body responded to the vaccine?”, answers receiving a score of 1 were: “The baby has 
seemed to develop ADHD from this vaccine because it has altered his brain” or “I think that 
the diagnosis of this child is caused by the vaccination”, while answers receiving a score of 0 
were “[The baby’s body responded] in the way that was expected” or “His immune system 
had to learn to fight off the tiny sample of the disease contained in the vaccine. This is what 
caused him to feel uneasy for a short while”. Since 8 inference questions were presented, the 
maximum score achievable was 8. Means and standard deviations for Experiment 1 are 
presented in Table 1. 
 




 Accuracy of recall. Results from the free recall test revealed that participants’ overall 
recall performance did not differ across conditions, F(2, 87) = .478, p = .622. Likewise, there 
was no difference in participants’ ability to answer factual questions across conditions, F(2, 
87) = 1.734, p = .183. 
 Inferential reasoning. Participants’ responses to inference questions were influenced 
by condition, F(2, 87) = 4.058, p = .021, η² = .085. Multiple comparisons using Tukey’s HSD 
test were conducted. Data are reported as mean differences and standard errors. Results 
showed that participants in the Baseline No-correction condition were more likely to refer to 
the original incorrect information to answer inference questions in comparison to the High-
expertise (M = 1, SE = .41, p = .045) and Low-expertise Correction (M = 1.03, SE = .41, p = 
.037) conditions. A non-parametric analysis was performed to demonstrate stability of the 
effects. Results from a Kruskal-Wallis H test demonstrated a statistically significant 
difference in inference scores among the three groups, χ2(2) = 8.132, p = .017. Pairwise 
comparisons were performed using Dunn’s procedure with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This post hoc analysis revealed 
statistically significant differences in inference scores between the Baseline No-correction 
(mean rank = 56.1) and Low-expertise Correction (mean rank = 40.68) (p = .05) groups and 
between the Baseline No-correction and High-expertise Correction (mean rank = 39.72) (p = 
.033) groups, but not between the Low- and High-expertise Correction groups. 
 Vaccination intent. Even though there was no effect of condition on vaccination 
intentions, F(2, 87) = 1.476, p = .234, there was a significant negative correlation between 
reference to the original incorrect information across conditions and vaccination intention, r = 
-.561, p < .01, showing that the more participants used misinformation to answer inference 





The hypothesis that source expertise affected the participants’ use of the original 
misinformation to address inference questions was not fully supported, as the overall 
reference to misinformation did not differ across the two correction groups. There was 
evidence of a continued influence effect of misinformation on the reported intention of 
vaccinate one’s child. Having investigated hypotheses related to the effects of source 
expertise, our next experiment turns to the question of source trustworthiness. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 examined the individual’s ability to disregard misinformation and adjust 
behaviour accordingly, when the correction is provided by a source of information deemed to 
be high or low in trustworthiness. 
 
3.1 Method 
 Participants. In line with previous similar studies (Guillory and Geraci 2013) we 
tested 90 participants. We have to disclose that, mirroring the study by Guillory and Geracy 
(2013), our original research design included two experiments, each featuring two correction 
conditions (Experiment 1 – on the role of expertise: High-expertise Correction condition and 
Low-expertise Correction condition; Experiment 2 – on the role of trustworthiness: High-
trustworthiness Correction condition and Low-trustworthiness Correction condition). As 
with Guillory and Geracy (2013), the experimental conditions in both experiments were 
compared against a single Baseline No-correction condition. However, following a 
Reviewer’s comment that the same control data should not be used for both experiments, we 
recruited new participants to be used as controls for Experiment 2. The analyses reported here 
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are based on the new control data. Participants involved in this experiment were 
undergraduates (32 men, 58 women, mean age 19.43 years, age range 17-26 years) from the 
University of Edinburgh who participated in exchange for course credit. As in Experiment 1, 
participants were assigned to 1 of the 3 conditions, namely the High-trustworthiness 
Correction condition, the Low-trustworthiness Correction condition, or the Baseline No-
correction condition (30 per condition). None took part in Experiment 1. 
 Study design. The study design was the same as in Experiment 1. Two principal 
hypotheses were formulated: 
H1: Participants will be less likely to use the original misinformation to answer 
inference questions when receiving a correction from a high-trustworthiness source 
than from a low-trustworthiness source.  
 H2: Participants who rely more on misinformation will report a lower intention to 
 vaccinate their own child. 
 
3.2 Procedure 
 Study materials and procedure mirrored those in Experiment 1 with one exception: in 
the High-trustworthiness Correction condition the correction came from “Family and 
friends” as a source of information with a high level of trustworthiness (M = 3.13, SD = 
1.06), while in the Low-trustworthiness Correction condition the correction came from 
“Television programs” as a source with a low level of trustworthiness (M = 1.47, SD = .64). 
Expertise of the high-trustworthy (M = 2.13, SD = .83) and low-trustworthy (M = 2.13, SD = 
.62) source was held constant across the two correction conditions (a report on the norming 





 Coding procedure. The coding procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1. A 
scorer checked all of the participants’ answers to the retraction-awareness question. All of the 
participants recalled the content of the correction statement. Significance was set at p < .05 
for all analyses. Inter-rater reliability for free recall, factual questions, and inference 
questions as assessed by different pairs of judges blind to condition allocation was found to 
be high (r = .87, .93, .91, respectively). Means and standard deviations for Experiment 2 are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
--------------- Insert Table 2 approximately here --------------- 
 
 Accuracy of recall. As in Experiment 1, results from the free recall test showed that 
the overall recall performance did not differ across conditions, F(2, 87) = 2.216, p = .115. 
Likewise, there was no difference in participants’ ability to recall factual questions across 
conditions, F(2, 87) = .489, p = .615. 
 Inferential reasoning. Participants’ responses to inference questions were influenced 
by condition, F(2, 87) = 9.319, p < .001, η² = .176. Multiple comparisons using Tukey’s HSD 
test were carried out. Data are reported as mean differences and standard errors. Results 
showed that participants in the High-trustworthiness Correction condition were less likely to 
refer to the original incorrect information to answer inference questions in comparison to the 
Low-trustworthiness Correction condition (M = -1.2, SE = .36, p = .003) and the Baseline 
No-correction condition (M = -1.43, SE = .3, p < .001). Use of the original information to 
answer inference questions did not differ across the Low-trustworthiness Correction 
condition and the Baseline No-correction condition, F < 1. A non-parametric analysis was 
performed to demonstrate stability of the effects. Results from a Kruskal-Wallis H test 
demonstrated a statistically significant difference in inference scores among the three groups, 
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χ2(2) = 18.745, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons were performed using Dunn’s procedure with 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Adjusted p-values are presented. This post 
hoc analysis revealed statistically significant differences in inference scores between the 
Baseline No-correction (mean rank = 53.43) and High-trustworthiness Correction (mean 
rank = 29.42) (p = .001) groups and between the High- and Low-trustworthiness Correction 
(mean rank = 53.65) (p < .001) groups, but not between the Baseline No-correction and Low-
trustworthiness Correction groups. 
 Vaccination intent. Analogous to Experiment 1, even though there was no effect of 
condition on vaccination intentions, F(2, 87) = 1.088, p = .341, there was a significant 
negative correlation between reference to the original incorrect information across conditions 
and vaccination intention, r = - .358, p < .01. This suggests that the more participants used 
misinformation to answer inference questions, the less likely they were to report that they 
would vaccinate their children.  
 
3.4 Discussion 
The pattern of results replicated those of Experiment 1, as there was no difference in 
participants’ free recall or responses to factual questions across conditions. Furthermore, 
there was evidence of a continued influence effect of misinformation on the reported 
intention to vaccinate one own’s child. However, a correction received from a high-
trustworthy source reduced participants’ reliance on misinformation.  
 
4. General Discussion 
Trust in vaccines is an important element of public health programs (Benin et al. 2006; Mills 
et al. 2005). In two experiments, we manipulated the credibility of the source of a correction 
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to evaluate the differential impact of source expertise (Experiment 1) and trustworthiness 
(Experiment 2) on the persistence of vaccine misinformation.  
 Results from Experiment 1 suggest that simply providing a correction reduced 
participants’ use of the original information, as participants in both correction conditions 
were less likely to continue using the original incorrect information to answer inference 
questions compared to participants in the baseline no-correction condition. However, our first 
hypothesis was not confirmed because the overall reference to misinformation did not differ 
across the two correction groups; indeed, when the correction in the story came from a more 
expert (but not more trustworthy) source, participants were just as likely to rely on erroneous 
information when making inferences about the story as those who received a correction from 
a less expert source. The null effect of the expertise of the source is noteworthy because it 
suggests that people may struggle to assess information quality and credibility, which is 
corroborated by the current lack of public trust in experts and science. Supporting the first 
hypothesis laid out for Experiment 2, participants were able to reduce their use of the original 
incorrect information when the correction came from a highly trustworthy source. This was 
confirmed by the fact that the use of the original information to answer inference questions 
did not differ across participants exposed to a low-trustworthy correction or to no correction 
at all. Thus, this finding suggests that source trustworthiness (and not expertise) is crucial in 
reducing people’s reliance on misinformation.  
 Some studies corroborate our conclusion that source trustworthiness is more 
important than source expertise in reducing misconceptions; therefore, corrections of 
misinformation should come from a trusted source (Trembath et al. 2016). In a cross-cultural 
experiment evaluating different combinations of high and low expertise and high and low 
trustworthiness, McGinnies and Ward (1980) found that a trustworthy source was more 
persuasive regardless of whether it was expert or not. A recent study by Swire and colleagues 
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(2017) corroborates the view that people use sources of information they believe trustworthy, 
though not necessarily expert, to guide their evaluation of what is true or false and do not 
necessarily insist on veracity as a prerequisite for supporting a particular viewpoint.  
 Both experiments reported here supported our prediction that the continued influence 
of misinformation would be negatively associated with vaccination intention, so that those 
who continued to rely on invalidated information were also less likely to state an intention to 
vaccinate their own child. The corrections we provided, regardless of their degree of 
credibility, did not positively affect the reported intent to vaccinate one’s child. The null 
effect concerning vaccination intention is not surprising and is consistent with the paucity of 
significant findings of pro-vaccination interventions on vaccine uptake (Jarrett et al. 2015; 
Nyhan et al. 2014; Pluviano et al. 2017; Pluviano et al. 2019). This null effect may be also 
partly explained by the role that “belief perseverance” may play during information 
processing: when confronted with new information that contradicts one’s own beliefs, people 
can unexpectedly hold on even more to their initial beliefs (Anderson et al. 1980; Kunda 
1990). In fact, one of the most potent backfire effects of corrective information strategies 
occurs with topics that align with people’s “worldviews” (Cook and Lewandowsky 2011; 
Hartman and Newmark 2012; Lewandowsky et al. 2017; Miller et al. 2016). There is some 
research demonstrating that people with strong attitudes and misbeliefs about vaccination 
may readily discredit information about the safety and effectiveness of a vaccine if this 
information is framed in a way that clashes with their pre-existing worldviews (Kahan et al. 
2010; Rossen et al. 2016). However, much research remains to be done to ascertain whether 
vaccine misinformation correlates with actual uptake and to what extent deeply-held beliefs 
could be affected by a correction perceived to come from a trustworthy source. For example, 
vaccine-hesitant individuals could be more easily persuaded by a message coming from a 
slightly less vaccine-hesitant individual who they perceive as trustworthy (Miton and Mercier 
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2015). Furthermore, it would be valuable to establish whether, when confronted with a novel 
vaccine (for instance, a possible vaccine against Zika virus), people might base their 
intentions to use it on beliefs about other vaccines (such as the misbelief that MMR causes 
autism). Recent studies have reported the possibility of dangerous spill-over effects from 
misbeliefs about one vaccine on intention to use another (Ophir and Jamieson 2018).   
 Besides prior beliefs, the variability of the effects of corrections could also be due to 
other individual characteristics, such as sense of identity, adherence to social norms, and past 
vaccination behaviours (Betsch et al. 2015). In light of the call for greater emphasis on 
tailoring communication around recipient characteristics (Durantini et al. 2006; Kumkale et 
al. 2010), future studies should address the effects of these variables. Furthermore, as people 
are more likely to trust advice from experts from their own ingroup, practitioners might 
consider employing a spokesperson from the target community to deliver the desired 
message. Also framing messages so that they are congruent with the worldview of the target 
group might be beneficial (MacFarlane et al. in press; Wang and Scheinbaum 2018).  
 Our findings must be interpreted in light of some limitations. Firstly, even though our 
sample size was in line with previous research (Guillory and Geraci 2013), recruiting a 
greater sample could have allowed us to more clearly show that the null effects we observed 
were not due to lack of power. Furthermore, the sample size of the norming study was quite 
limited and, collapsing across all the sources, the correlation between participants’ ratings on 
the sources’ expertise and trustworthiness was high (r = .79, p < .01). However, the sources 
we selected are frequently reported to be trusted by parents for vaccine-safety information, 
including, among others, websites by doctor groups, or family and friends. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that levels of trust in specific sources of vaccine-safety information may vary 
significantly by gender and groups (Freed et al. 2011). Future research should consider this 
aspect when creating different, tailored strategies. Further experimental investigations are 
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also needed to estimate people’s beliefs before delivering informative materials about 
vaccines. Another potential limitation of our study relates to the source “family and friends” 
we selected in Experiment 2. Though rather unlikely, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
participants, when evaluating the credibility of this source, considered their own family and 
friends rather than those of the mother presented in the story, which could have influenced 
the results. Furthermore, our sample consisted of university students who have usually not 
been exposed to real decision making about vaccinating their children; this may limit the 
generalizability of our results. Also, overall inference scores were relatively low, showing 
that even in the no-correction condition, participants did not much rely on misinformation in 
answering inference questions. Likewise, the overall vaccination intentions were quite high, 
suggesting that our sample was biased towards those with more positive views of vaccines. 
Another limitation pertains to the use of fictional narratives in the current experiments. A 
growing literature points to the beneficial use of narratives as educational tools to 
communicate science to laypeople (e.g., Dahlstrom, 2014; Prins, Avraamidou, & Goedhart, 
2017; Ritchie, Tomas, & Tones, 2011). As highlighted by a recent review by Fadlallah and 
colleagues (2019), the benefits related to employing narratives to impact health policy-
making are manifold: narratives are easily understandable and so can facilitate information 
processing; they have been demonstrated to be both memorable and persuasive; they can add 
value and emotional appeal to the information provided; and, finally, people can relate to 
narratives regardless of their level of literacy, expertise or culture. However, our findings 
could still not apply to real-world communications in a straightforward manner. Future 
studies might usefully compare narrative communication with other techniques resembling 
the ones used in real-world immunization programs. Finally, our study design allowed the 
investigation of main effects only. Given the wide array of variables that are associated with 
source credibility, interaction effects are of interest “because some of them can dramatically 
21 
 
affect the superiority of a high-credibility source such that a low credibility source turns out 
to be more influential” (Pornpitakpan 2004, p. 266-267). Therefore future research could look 
into possible relationships between source credibility and other factors that have not yet been 
thoroughly investigated, such as implicit-explicit refutation as well as recipients’ personality 
traits. 
In conclusion, the present study adds to the growing literature demonstrating the persistence 
of misinformation in memory, showing how difficult effective correction can be. In the 
specific case of health information, our research showed that corrections are effective as long 
as they come from a perceived trustworthy source. This finding is noteworthy to better 
comprehend the loss of public confidence in science and experts.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for the experimental conditions in Experiment 1 
 High-expertise 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Low-expertise 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Baseline No-
correction 
(n = 30) 
Outcome M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free-recall 
accuracy  
10.33 (1.81) 10.47 (1.48) 10.03 (1.96) 
Factual questions 6.33 (1.13) 6.83 (.9) 6.48 (1.15) 
Inference 
questions 
1.17 (1.7) 1.13 (1.33) 2.17 (1.72) 
Vaccination intent 5.03 (1.16) 5.13 (1.28) 4.57 (1.61) 
Note. Means and standard deviations of free-recall accuracy rates (out of a maximum of 14), factual 
and inference questions’ scores (out of a maximum of 8; higher means indicate a greater reliance on 
misinformation), and vaccination intent (measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “very unlikely” 
to 6 = “very likely”) for the High- and Low-expertise Correction conditions and the Baseline No-
correction condition. 
 
Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for the experimental conditions in Experiment 2 
 High-trustworthiness 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Low-trustworthiness 
Correction 
(n = 30) 
Baseline No-
correction 
(n = 30) 
Outcome M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Free-recall 
accuracy  
10.4 (1.87) 9.93 (1.8) 9.47 (1.46) 
Factual 
questions 
6.67 (.94) 6.7 (.83) 6.47 (1.17) 
Inference 
questions 
.5 (1.04) 1.7 (1.18) 1.93 (1.8) 
Vaccination 
intent 
5.4 (.93) 5 (1.36) 5.03 (1.16) 
Note. Means and standard deviations of free recall accuracy rates (out of a maximum of 14), factual 
and inference questions’ scores (out of a maximum of 8; higher means indicate a greater reliance on 
misinformation), and vaccination intent (measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 = “very unlikely” 
30 
 
to 6 = “very likely”) for the High- and Low-trustworthiness Correction conditions and the Baseline 
No-correction condition.  
